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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY
Oklahoma. In Kingkade Hotel Co. v. Keggin' the court held
that where one corporation owned a hotel and a separate corpo-
ration managed it, it was reversible error to allow the plaintiff
to sue the owner corporation for a tort committed by the manage-
ment corporation. The plaintiff had sued the Kingkade Hotel Com-
pany, the owner corporation, for wrongful ejectment from his
hotel room and conversion of his baggage. At the trial the plain-
tiff offered no evidence that the Hotel Kingkade was operated by
the defendant. Martin Kingkade testified for the defendant that
there were two separate corporations: the Kingkade Hotel Com-
pany, the incorporated owner of the hotel and furniture, and the
Hotel Kingkade, the corporation which operated the hotel. King-
kade testified that he was the president of the Kingkade Hotel
Company, and that he was manager of Hotel Kingkade. He also
testified that he owned stock in both corporations. The defendant
offered in evidence the separate annual corporation license for
each of the corporations, but the trial court sustained an objec-
tion to the introduction of these instruments.
Kingkade testified that the Kingkade Hotel Company, the de-
fendant in the suit, had nothing to do with the operation of the
hotel. The testimony that there were two separate corporations,
one of which owned the building and the other of which operated
the hotel, and that this defendant had nothing to do with the
operation of the hotel was uncontradicted. At the conclusion of the
testimony the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that
the evidence showed that the defendant was not at any time oper-
ating the hotel. The motion was overruled. The jury rendered a
general verdict for the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed on the grounds that
1 208 Okla. 464, 257 P. 2d 504 (1953).
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the burden was on the plaintiff to show that this defendant was
liable, and that in fact the uncontradicted evidence showed that
this defendant was not liable.
The court cited its prior decision in the Hilliard case,2 which
said:
... it was apparent at the time of plaintiff's injury and at the time
of the trial the owner and operator of the Frisco properties was the
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, and that it was, at the
times referred to, a separate and distinct corporate entity from the St.
Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company.
In Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Loveland' the headnote accurately
states the holding of the Colorado court:
Where there were two corporations... and on the trial of an action
against the former it developed that the acts complained of were com-
mitted by the latter, it was error to allow an amendment of the com-
plaint making the latter corporation defendant, on the ground that
such amendment was the correction of a misnomer.
The instant case points out the vast distinction between suing
the right person under the wrong name, and suing the wrong per-
son.4 The principal question was whether there were two separate
and distinct corporate entities, and if so, whether the plaintiff
had sued the wrong one. The court's affirmative answers to these
questions were based upon several factors.
In U.S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Company5 the court
said that a corporation will be looked on as a separate legal
entity "until sufficient reason to the contrary appears." In the pres-
ent case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant coporation, King-
kade Hotel Company, was operating the hotel when the incident
occurred. Thus, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that this
defendant was liable, and this burden was not met. The uncon-
tradicted testimony showed that the Kingkade Hotel Company had
2 Hilliard v. St. Louis and S. F. Rr., 98 Okla. 22, 223 Pac. 877, 878 (1924).
3 16 Colo. App. 146, 64 Pac. 381 (1901).
4 See cases cited in 2 McDONALD, TEXAs CIVIL PRACTICE (lst ed. 1950) § 8.09 n. 63.
5 142 Fed. 247, 255 (C.C. E.D. Wis. 1905).
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nothing to do with the operation of the hotel, and that the hotel
was operated by a separate and distinct corporation, the Hotel
Kingkade. There were several factors tending to show that the
corporations were separate and distinct.
One of the main factors in determining whether two corpora-
tions are separate is the question of ownership.6 Where one cor-
poration is completely owned by another, this is evidence of
merger of the corporate entities; however, this is definitely not
conclusive evidence. Since the main purpose of incorporation is
to separate the entity of the business from its owners, this can
be true for one owner just as much as for several owners. It is the
purpose of incorporation, and not the number of incorporators,
that determines whether the corporation was organized in good
faith. As was said in Security Savings and Trust Co. v. Portland
Flour Mills Co.,
"The reason for the application of the rule [i.e., disregarding the
corporate entity] is to prevent fraud and not because all the capital
stock is owned by one person."
Thus, the fact in the present case that Mr. Kingkade owned some,
but not all, of the stock in both corporations would certainly not
be strong enough evidence to require that the corporations be
regarded as one entity.
A second factor in determining whether a corporation is a sep-
rate entity is management 8 One cannot lay down an ironclad
rule as to when one corporation is under the management of an-
other corporation, for it is quite possible that one may, in good
faith, be an officer or agent of two distinct corporations at the
same time. This is really a question of fact, depending upon such
factors as separate office space, accounting procedures, separa.
6 See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 128; also cases cited in 1
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 41 n. 3.
7 124 Ore. 276, 261 Pac. 432, 436 (1927).
8 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 43.
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tion of assets, same officers, method of payment of agents, same
directors meetings, etc.
A third factor in determining whether a corporation is a sepa-
rate legal entity is the purpose of incorporation.' Ballantine has
said, "As the separate personality or capacity of a corporation is
a privilege, it must be used for legitimate purposes and must not
be perverted into a fraudulent device."" For example, in U.S. v.
Milwaukee Refrigerated Transit Company" the Pabst Brewing
Company had caused a transit company to be formed as a sub-
sidiary. By contract Pabst gave the transit company exclusive
control of the shipping of its freight over the railroads. The
transit company received commissions from the railroads for
procuring the business for them. The separate corporate entity
was there used in an attempt to conceal the crime of rebating.
There are many other examples of disregarding the corporate
entity to prevent frauds; e.g., to prevent evasion of state revenue
laws,12 to prevent combinations in restraint of trade,13 to prevent
evasion of debts,' 4 and to prevent frauds in general. 5
Mr. Ballantine sums up the problem very well when he says:
It is submitted that no mechanical rule based on objective facts of
control or connection which will furnish a certain test is possible to
formulate. Identity of stockholders, identity of officers, the manner of
keeping books and records, the methods of conducting the corporate
business as a separate concern or as a mere department of the other
concern, may be evidential facts to be considered as bearing on the
question of juggling of separate capacities and whether the subsidiary
is being managed in such a way as to make the controlling corpora-
tion justly responsible. But after all it comes down to a question of
good faith and honesty in the use of the corporate privilege for legiti-
mate ends.18
9 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 122.
10 Id., § 123.
11 Cited supra note 5.
12 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 142.
13 1 FLETCIER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 45.
14 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 130.
15 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 41.
16 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) § 136.
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CONSIDERATION FOR CAPITAL STOCK
Texas. In Dunagan v. Bushey"7 the plaintiff had told one of the
defendants that he would not subscribe to capital stock of the
corporation which the defendants were promoting until the corpo-
ration received its charter. In order to secure the charter, the
defendants obtained a personal loan of $18,000 from a bank
under the representation that they proposed to repay the loan by
selling to the corporation, after its organization, certain properties
and a franchise worth the amount of the loan. The promoters paid
for more than 50 per cent of the authorized stock with the $18,-
000, and the Secretary of State issued the articles of incorpora-
tion. Later the defendants, acting as directors of the corporation,
withdrew the $18,000 received for the stock from the corporate
account by a check payable to them personally, and repaid the
$18,000 they had originally borrowed. Neither the property nor
the franchises were ever delivered to the corporation. The Su-
preme Court of Texas held that the plaintiff could compel the
defendants to repay the $18,000 to the corporate account.
The case is noted because of its similarity to a common prac-
tice today. Under the present Texas incorporation law, the Secre-
tary of State may require that a proposed corporation seeking a
charter file an audit of its books or an appraisal of its prop-
erties.' This procedure may be both time-consuming and expen-
sive; so incorporators have developed the practice of obtaining a
loan upon the security of the property which they ultimately
intend to transfer to the corporation. The cash received from the
loan is then used to pay for the stock. After incorporation, the
incorporators, acting as directors of the corporation, purchase the
original property with the money paid for the stock, and so long
as the property is purchased at a proper value, the transaction
is sound. Then the money received by the incoporators for the
17 ... Tex -- , 263 S.W. 2d 148 (1953).
18 Tvx. REv. CMy. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1309.
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property trans/erred to the corporation is used to repay their per-
sonal loan and the transaction is completed.
This is probably what the defendants in the present case had
in mind, but failed to do. Under the facts of the principal case,
the incorporators paid the money back to themselves, but gave the
corporation nothing in exchange; thus the corporation was paying
for the personal debts of the directors rather than paying for
property received, and the transaction was improper.
Robert H. Showen.
